

The chapter on creativity and psychoanalysis examines how art objects are distillations of a self, or form objects that momentarily objectify the aesthetic effect of being a self.

Finally, however, something runs through us that cannot be gathered into representation, either that of illness or art. 'Fortunate he who's made the voyage of Odysseus' writes Seferis in 'Reflections on a Foreign Line of Verse', 'Fortunate if on setting out he's felt the rigging of a love strong in his body, spreading there like veins where the blood throbs'. Because if so it yields:

A love of indissoluble rhythm, unconquerable like music
and endless
because it was born when we were born and when we die
whether it dies too neither we know nor does anyone else.

Something of a mystery to the very end.

ORIGINS OF THE THERAPEUTIC ALLIANCE

Understandably people on the verge of psychoanalysis are anxious about such an undertaking, but it is striking that they take to it in a remarkably natural way. Why? On what basis do they agree to this curious division of function, they as free associating speaker, the analyst as 'evenly suspended' listener?

Perhaps the concept of the therapeutic alliance recognises an essential partition within the analysand: an intense, anguished, dreamy, illogical and sometimes child-like part, and another, not completely absorbed by such intense private realities, an observer cooperating with the analyst, countering such intense states with delay, with insight, and often enough with understanding.

The analysand seems to understand that analysis works if he submits to a process which holds him as he free associates. Giving up narrative control to become a certain sort of subject within a process guided by the intelligence of the other may be unconsciously familiar, as the foetus has been inside the mother, the infant inside a world largely managed by the mother, and the child all the while inside the logic of family structure. The partitioning of self in the analytic process, when one gives up focalised consciousness to become part of a psychic evolution derived from more than one consciousness, is a division which each person knows, though to varying extents.

Even if we disagree over whether a foetus has a sense of being inside a womb, or when and how an infant perceives the mother, perhaps we can agree that at some point infants have a sense of some external organising intelligence (for the foetus it would be the spirit of the biological work of the uterus) to which they are allied, which they are inside, but about which they have limited knowledge. Allowing for the infant's subjective capability, for his capacity to render his experience of place in that psychic area available to him, we may assume that he knows he is part of an intelligence beyond his thinking and yet it is essential to his physical and psychic well-being, if not survival.

In other words, infants know that they are inside a human process, which Winnicott termed a holding environment, that contains them, and the

alterations sponsored in the infant's psychosomatic states by this other contributes to the sense of this being a transformational situation: one that recurrently alters self experience.

Alongside the mother is the father's transforming presence, and eventually the child recognises that he is inside a very particular family with its ways of being and relating. The Oedipal stage is, in many respects, the discovery that one's fate is to be inside a complex, consisting of the family and an internal world of one's own making.

Hence the analysand will unconsciously perceive the treatment alliance as a derivative of earlier alliances that goes back to the formation of being: to a foetal sense of being inside a uterine intelligence, and to the increased sense in infancy that one is inside a container that is alive, psychic (in the sense of unconsciously determinative) and consequential. To varying degrees this experience of being inside a process to which one contributes will be transferred to the clinical space as the patient reconstructs his experience of being contained by the body and psyche of the other.

Thus people ally with the process of analysis, not simply with the person of the analyst. The two alliances are not the same. If the patient attends regularly, lies on the couch, free associates and expresses himself in the transference, he is allied to the analytic procedure. How a particular patient uses this process will depend on his earlier psychic alliances with containers such as the womb, the mother, the father and the mind itself. Naturally how the analysand uses or relates to the person of the analyst (differentiated from the process in which both are participants) is of enormous significance, particularly when juxtaposed to the use of the alliance. If he uses the analytical process to eliminate the analyst's interpretations, for example, or abandons participation in the analytic method and relates more to the person of the analyst, he is conveying a great deal about his previous alliances.

Indeed a part of any therapeutic alliance is the mutual recognition and use by patient and analyst of the analytical process which precedes, holds and will outlive any specific analytical couple, and which is implicitly present as a third object. It cannot, of course, go without saying that the psychoanalyst – for innumerable reasons – can lose his alliance with the third object such as when he dispenses with requests for free association, or abandons the essential ballast of silence to make interpretations.

Analyst and analysand are part of something which in a certain sense guides them in a most paradoxical way. To work together they must seemingly abandon one another. The patient must abandon his normal social behaviour and lose himself in a method which becomes a new means of self expression. The analyst must abandon his wish to be helpful, decline the patient's requests for immediate therapeutic remedy, and immerse himself in a receptive attitude, open to the patient's unconscious communications, if he is to receive his analysand's internal world.

Both participants know that each becomes a temporarily lessened consciousness, and analysable patients are often very aware that their analyst's interpretations come from that place of essential psychic devolution where the analyst lives while listening to and being in-formed by the other. Recognition of the particular nature of the analyst's comments – emerging into speech from evenly hovering attentiveness – further consolidates each contributor's role in the alliance to the method. The patient appreciates the analyst's alliance to a method that must be prior to the analyst's experiential relations to the patient (transferential and countertransferential). The analysand knows that each must enter the process in order to form any alliance that will eventually prove therapeutic.

It is no accident that Freud took the dream as the cornerstone of psychoanalysis, where the person splits into two basic psychic structures: the 'simple self' who is the experiential subject inside the dream; and the organising intelligence that creates the dream environment and gives it meaning. This mirrors the split of foetal and infant life, of a simple self immersed inside a complex intelligence, a structure which becomes part of the nature of intrapsychic life. Nor should it elude our notice that the simple self's experience of the cosmology-creating work of the unconscious ego psychically substantiates the conviction that we live inside a mysterious intelligence.

When we wake from a dream, we reflect on it and understand something of it with that complex self which is able to consider its many parts while the simple participant self is too caught up in (or 'enlisted by') the ego's theatre to observe.

In analysis the person is deconstructed by projections, diverging self experiences, shifting moods and free associations, becoming a comparatively simple participant who does not know, joined by the analyst who also devolves self consciousness to the free movement of thought, the better to be informed of his patient's psychic effect. Patients know that they and their analysts use the analytical process to maximise the registrations of psychic life, licensed by periodic loss of the ambitions of consciousness.

In the dream a simple self is repeatedly inside a highly complex theatre of eventful thoughts and allegorical personages, which constitutes an intrapsychic warrant for the treatment alliance. As each analysand has just been inside a process of projective renderings of his complexity into words, images, events and feelings – walked through them as the simple experiencing self in the dream – now when he enters the analytical space to freely realise this complexity through the gaps of meaning latent to the chains of signifiers, the iconic hieroglyphs of visual images, the allegory of persons composed, the mnemonic function of persons resurrected from the past, he seems to create another space and another purpose for dream life.

When Freud divided the analytical couple in two – the one to free associate and report dreams, the other to evenly hover and then interpret – he cannily

exploited an ordinary partition between subjective and objective states of mind, oscillating between more or less deeply subjective renderings of reality and more or less objective reflections upon prior subjective states. Often lost in thought, perhaps inside a daydream, or just perambulating through preconscious senses of part ideas, part memories, part instinctual representations, we emerge to think more clearly, incisively and even systematically before we return to more subjective states of self. This recurring oscillation between two mental positions (subjective/objective) is essential to process life's episodes and one's contextual state of affairs. Recognition of this need contributes to the analysand's unconscious realisation and use of the analytical relation which places intrapsychic life into interpersonal space so that the analyst could eventually affect the nature of the patient's psychic structure.

This oscillation between the self immersed in its complexity (associations and projections) and a more reflective self subsequently objectifying those states (dissociations and reflections) is also the structure of inner speech: split as we are between the speaker (the I) and the addressed (the you). We often employ this rhetorical split in order to mediate between unconscious derivatives and perceptions proper. When the analysand speaks freely he does so not just to an historic object from the transference, but also to the rhetorical other: the you who never replies. (Only the I speaks in inner speech.) The analyst's silence allies with the rhetorical you of intrapsychic discourse, and contributes to unconscious recognition of the nature of the analytical partnership.

There are fateful alliances between the self in the dream and the dreamer, between the I and the you of internal speech, and between the I and the world of reported objects, that serve as structural precedents for the psychoanalytic relationship. In order to think psychic reality, one of the characters in the split must be the simple self abandoning focus to the other part(ner). The working alliance recognises the need for episodic lessened consciousness in the interests of increased unconscious representations (in dreams, daydreams, perambulatory ideas, creative processes) as well as the need for equally recurring moments of reflective observation, scrutiny and analysis. This essential internal contract, an ordinary feature of mental life, is the division of labour constructed by the separate roles of analyst (reflective, observant, scrutinising, analysing) and of patient (dreaming, daydreaming, free associating, ideationally perambulating).

The subject is summoned to think about his life because he is confronted by its mystery. From *mysterium*, originally a 'supernatural thing', or also in Latin a *mysterium*, a secret rite, mystery now means 'something unexplained, unknown' or 'any thing or event that remains so secret or obscure as to excite curiosity'. An infant lives inside a world substantially beyond comprehension and most deeply mysterious, and partly because of its novelty (which Daniel Stern stresses) it invites what Melanie Klein

emphasised, the 'epistemophilic instinct': a drive to know. This drive is an essential part of one's encounter with the mysteries of life, from the ordinary recurring mystery show of dreams, to the secret of the internal world, to the enigmas of the universe and of the physical world that inspires scientific curiosity and work. Theological explanation of this world of ours, and our place in it, is an essential endeavour to think about the complexities of life, but its premature vision, sustained now by anaemic faith, testifies to the strain of trying to know more than one does.

Patients and analysts enter into an alliance that aims to examine and change pathological mental contents through the analyst's interpretive work and containing function and in so doing to alter psychic structure itself. Some, having significantly benefited from this process, institute a type of negative therapeutic reaction which seems to destroy the alliance. One patient, for example, echoed every word I uttered in a session. Many attempt to turn the tables, demanding to know what the analyst 'really thinks', not what he says he thinks.

There is something ordinary – indeed perhaps rather essential – about this challenge to the alliance. Living as the comparative simple selves of consciousness, in our mother's system of care, our family's complex, our dreams, our polyphonic sequentials of self experience, the you that receives the I's discourses, there is a natural curiosity to know what drives the entirety. The infant and dreamer: 'Where is this all coming from?' The self at experience: 'What organises and generates all these different experiencings I am having?' 'How can I turn this wheel that turns my life, / Create another hand to move this hand / Not moved by me, who am not the mover' writes Edwin Muir in 'The Wheel'. But who shall ever be there to answer such questions, even though Faust is the tale of one who requested just that?

Then one day, in Western civilisation, the psychoanalyst appeared, upholder and guardian of a process that evoked some of the mysteries of human life. Did he know that the structure of the analytical process could evoke the transfer of so many different if interconnected alliances: of foetus inside womb, infant inside maternal world, child inside the Law of the Father, child inside family complexity, self inside the dream, addressee inside the textures of the I's discourses? Did he know the extent and range of what he elicited by creation of the analytical space?

Because of the uncannily evocative effect of the psychoanalytic structure, many analysands, inside a mystery play, seek the secret of its intelligence, like the infant seeking knowledge of the mother's unconscious, the dreamer the other who dreams him, the self the *ur* source of self experiencing. A form of noumenal transference, the subject insists upon breaking through the derivatives to find the real or the thing in itself, just as Captain Ahab insisted on finding the actual white whale which he felt surely would be like breaking through 'the pasteboard masks of all outward presentiments'. It is this which destroys the intrapsychic working alliance that operates through an

illusion that the world we imagine is the real one, even as we nourish the forces of psychic reality that continually transform it. Rather than transferring a mental content to the psychic person of the analyst, the noumenal transference bears an epistemophilic demand to the presumed intelligence informing the analytic process. From this demand answers about the true nature of reality are meant to emerge, a reversal of negative capability: a wilful insistence of evidence for belief.

The analysand who challenges the working alliance may express a noumenal transference, as he challenges illusion in order to see the real: the real analyst, the real intelligence assumed to be there somewhere guiding the movements of the analysis. Analysis of the destructive, paranoid and primal scene derivatives may not suffice, as the extent to which this action characterises the destruction of any working alliance necessitates a recognition of what the analysand actually seeks.

Analysands are shocked to find their analyst in the street, a surprise deriving from the feeling that he has just glimpsed the analyst as he really is, functioning in his real world. However pleasing such an encounter, it is always on the verge of the traumatic as the analyst, now in the real, seems to erupt in the field of culturally endowed objects.

To come towards the end of an analysis – just as one approaches the end of life – knowing much more about oneself, possessed of new and valued visions, but still feeling that life is deeply mysterious, can be hard. Do analysands break the alliance to ask who really runs this show? The fact that no one may, that it just is, and that we just are, may drive many to disprove the processive cure of analysis by aiming to see through the person of the analyst.

On the other hand, analysands have been in the presence of the 'other as process', formed and transformed by the analyst's silences, perceptions, imaginings, constructions, interpretations, and vocal engagements, all reflecting an unconscious formal response to the movement of the patient's character as it uses (and shapes) the analyst. These two juxtaposed aesthetics shape and know one another as moving idioms of effect.

The patient will therefore feel that he has encountered the real as the analyst, immanent to the analyst as an intelligence of form, and that his own unconscious has engaged this intelligence. Unconscious to unconscious, a noumenal-noumenal encounter, a meeting of two immaterial logics engaging one another. To this inner logic guiding us we have always used our highest signifier; it is from this experience that we construct a theory of God from which we originate. And the intelligence inside us – internally guiding us – seems to connect with a similar 'soul to soul' meeting in the other. It is a paradoxical meeting. So deep and yet so impossible to describe.

Winnicott wrote of an area of 'essential aloneness', a part of the inevitable and necessary solitude of any one self. Such aloneness was not equivalent to isolation or loneliness, indeed, it was generative, precisely because its

existence was underwritten by the presence of the other. Hence one could be alone in the presence of the other, a complex statement to be read in many ways. This capacity to be with one's self, unintruded upon by the need to relate, also designates the arrival of the capacity to be one's self irrespective of, and in difference with, the very presence of the other.

When Freud encouraged his patients to freely associate in the presence of the analyst and not be bullied by an inner notion of what was or was not worthwhile material, he too was making an exceptionally complex statement: he was urging the person to speak irrespective of the presence of inner censorship; but simultaneously acknowledging that the capacity to do so also depended on the patient's ability to forget the anticipated judgements of the other. To speak the patient had to forget the other's presence, but ironically, such a negative capacity brought about the very arrival of a speaker in the thick of solitude.

Psychoanalysts have not adequately written about the profound but deeply generative aloneness of the psychoanalyst, his patient...and the psychoanalysis. I know that I cannot describe the place where I work, even though the terms 'evenly suspended attentiveness' or 'reverie' or the 'analytic attitude' are fortunately there as signifiers which I can use, but do they really designate psychical life in this place?

Psychoanalysis takes place between two people yet feels as if it lives within the deepest recesses of my private life.

This may be another way of discussing the unconscious, but if so, I wish to address this fact personally. For every encounter with a patient sends me deeply into myself, to an area of essential aloneness processed by voiceless laws of dense mental complexity.

As I shall discuss in the next chapter, the analyst and his patient are in a curiously autobiographical state, moving between two histories, one privileged (the patient) and the other recessed (the analyst), in the interests of creating generative absence, so that the patient may create himself out of two 'materials': his own movement in language and his unknown journey in the material of the analyst's passing ideas.

The place where we live. Alone and yet...in the presence of the other. >

Guided by a temporality that is both immediate and yet bears the past, that is both infinitely polysemous and yet bound by the limits of consciousness and culture, that cannot be shared with the other, even though it needs the other's presence to thrive, the participants 'enter' analysis.

Alone yet active, this thick inner networking carries on regardless. It cathects objects, signifies them, mobilises psychic intensities, demands and gets dreams, and bears the subject through the objects presented from day to day. In the consulting room, less stimulating than ordinary life, and yet more deeply prescient to this inner world, the analysand finds himself living an illusion: that here, at last, he is able to speak from this inner place. Here at

last he is able to give voice to this densely moving complexity. The analyst shares that illusion.

But an illusion, not a delusion. How deeply moving an irony it is that both know that analysis does not really provide the place of representation of such deep inner sharing, and yet each believes it to be so. There is such a wonderfully radical defiance of the possible in a psychoanalysis; indeed, a defiance that has more than once earned it comparison with the theatre. But surely this defiance allows both participants a deep developing sense that they are coming closer and closer to truths that inform life.

Even when we specify a very particular aspect of the clinical situation it is still impossible to speak for the unconscious. For all our discussion of the here and now transference, is it really possible to describe the immediate? It is so tempting to say that because it is happening in our presence – rather than in the past and somewhere else – that therefore we can know it. But perhaps this very luxury of presence proves on further consideration to be such a paradox. Blanchot writes that the vexing problem of the immediate is that it always eludes representation even if it informs all moments.

The immediate is a presence to which one cannot be present, but from which one cannot separate; or again, it is what escapes by the very fact that there is no escaping it: the *ungraspable that one cannot let go of*.

(1993: 45)

The movement of the present moment is not part of a process of intelligent collecting of experience even if it may be an outcome. Rather it is 'the infinite shifting of dispersal, a non-dialectical movement where contrariety has nothing to do with opposition or reconciliation, and where the *other* never comes back to the same' (46).

Thus we do not know our experience of the present even as it is part of our intelligent movement through life. 'What is obscure in this movement', writes Blanchot, 'is what it discloses: what is always dis-closed without having had to disclose itself, and has always in advance reduced all movement of concealing or self-concealing to a mode of the manifest' (46). The immediate is the impossible (to describe) and becomes objectified as that which is outside our knowing but receiving special status.

We must, says Blanchot, recognise 'in impossibility our most human belonging to immediate human life' (47). Communicating this human experience is not possible; speech both attempts to cross that intrinsic divide between self and other and reaffirms the fundamental difference between any two people.

It is our task, Blanchot says, 'To name the possible, to respond to the impossible, [to] respond to this speech that surpasses my hearing, to respond

to it without having really understood it, and to respond to it in repeating it, in making it speak' (65).

There is a 'strangeness' between people. An 'interruption escaping all measure' (68), an infinite separation, that is the outcome of that difference between any two persons. I cannot know the other, claims Blanchot. Indeed the other in his ultimate unknowability – I cannot know his inner self experience – constitutes a psychic presence in all our lives, which Blanchot terms 'the neutral'. The Other, or the He, is the 'Third Person' and yet not a person as it brings the 'neutral into play' (71).

'The neutral relation, a relation without relation' (73) [italics mine] brings man in all his strangeness to himself, and constitutes the 'unknown in its infinite distance' (77).

When Freud created neutrality did he implicitly recognise in it the immediate presence of the unknowable? Was the patient's speech, then, to be part of the ultimate realisation that communication recognised the impossibility of itself, insofar as speech both conveys mental content and yet does not?

We may further wonder if the creation of neutrality bears the curious truth of the impossibility of transferring the self-analytic experience to the self-other relation. Turning to contemporary interest in the field of the interpersonal, we would have to find a place for neutrality as a representation of an essential feature of all human relations: that the other is beyond hearing and knowing – speakable to but impossible to hear from. Neutrality is, then, an indispensable part of the psychoanalysis. Too interpersonal a relation, one that socialised neutrality and displaced it, would refuse this truth.

While not denying the interpersonal element or the comforting contexts of living inside an interpretation, the patient feels that the analyst too acknowledges the indisputable fact that the other is ultimately beyond knowing. That which operates alongside and yet outside the pair, in the solitary privacy of these separate individuals. Psychoanalysis does not fail to represent this separate movement, one that lives between the lines, and has always recognised it as the character of the unconscious. To be found in Freud, much as Lacan indicated, is a subject who speaks to no one, not even to himself; indeed, where to speak is to be spoken through, interrupted by this unconscious that slips us up as it expresses unconscious psychic reality.

The silence of the analyst, a particular form of listening, privileging the word as the means of the subject's movement, addresses that side of a psychoanalysis alongside and outside the countertransference: it is a movement that operates regardless of what the analyst thinks or feels. Caught up in an intense imaginary theatre with his patient, the clinician may be well on his way to organising an important story, all the while moved by factors mediated by the imaginary.

Free association, for example, is independent of a relation to the analyst, even when it alludes to it, and even though it exists only meaningfully within

proximity to an attentive other. The link between signifiers and the constellations of signifieds, however, operates according to its own networks, outside the imaginary fields that it nonetheless evokes. As I shall discuss in Chapter 5 the psychoanalyst's inner subjective response is always counterpointed by this inner movement of the objective: the march of signifiers that dispenses psychic truths irrespective of human relations.

Important features of psychoanalysis are beyond the interpersonal. We cannot know the other or the meaning of the immediate, but these pressing facts of life are given honorary place in a psychoanalysis through a certain presentation of their natures: the immediate has given an impact in and through the interplays of free association, and analytic reverie and the unknowability of any other is sustained by the function of the neutral.

Rudely inconsiderate of feelings, personal relations, and theatres of the mind, the symbolic function of language simply speaks regardless. It does not care about the countertransference.

Is psychoanalysis a dialogue? A conversation? An intersubjective occasion? Is it a one body psychology or a two body psychology? Where is it to be found? There are dialogues. It can be interpersonal. In some respects it is also intersubjective. And of course both participants are always intrapsychics. Transference always occurs as does countertransference and they are rather enamoured of one another. Every above-named element is present. It is all of those things, but in the end, none of them.

It is the site of a mystery that will not vanish through the appropriate aims of categorical nomination.

THE PLACE OF THE PSYCHOANALYST

It may have been St. Augustine who first used a theological form to create a new psychological relation. Prompted by his spiritual crisis, he reflected in the *Confessions* on his internal world in a unique way, as both subject determining the enquiry and the object of his investigation. His introspection was, of course, licensed by the Christian model of conflict, between the forces of Christ and anti-Christ, but the literary form derived from his practice was, as Abrams maintains, the 'first sustained history of an inner life' (1971: 83).

Men had always looked to themselves in one way or another. St. Augustine did not invent introspection, but he created a voice that influenced all subsequent autobiographical endeavours.

Certainly Montaigne in his *Essays* and Pascal in his *Pensées* reflect something of an autobiographical stance in their essays, but it is really in the seventeenth-century Puritan diary, such as that by Michael Wigglesworth, that self examination achieved a new depth, although typically these confessions are driven by a desire to reveal the self to a shrewd deity not fooled by bad faith. Like so many Puritan writers, Wigglesworth tore his soul from its small-minded habitations to confess to his God every nook and cranny of evil's doings.

Unlike St. Augustine, the Puritan's self-disclosure was driven by unconscious efforts to fool God into voting the believer into the world of the elect and therefore to an afterlife. Puritans faced the clearly unhappy task of disclosing devious personality features hoping confession would win grace, even though this was meant to be an arbitrary and predetermined choice of the God.

With Rousseau, the urge to inform on others virtually overwhelmed his enterprise, yet he also confessed his own sins and his work has the hallmark of autobiography. The first writing of this specific literary form, however, belongs to W.P. Scargill, whose book *The Autobiography of a Dissenting Minister* was published in 1834 (Olney 1980: 5). The word 'autobiography' was invented at the end of the eighteenth century when 'three Greek